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Greece as an example of “post-politics” in the eurozone 
Filippa Chatzistavrou and Sofia Michalaki 
he past six months of negotiations between Greece and the EU/IMF have tested the 
unity, limits, stamina and financial interdependence of eurozone member states. 
Greece has emerged wounded from the fray, but Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has 
established beyond doubt his dominance in Greek politics, against all odds, and in defiance of 
partisan competitors at home and his counterparts’ wishes in the rest of Europe. Beyond the 
political significance of Syriza’s victory, this third vote of confidence in seven months brings 
certain characteristics of both Greek and EU politics into sharper relief.  
This commentary briefly outlines these characteristics and the wider impact they may have 
for the EU. 
Towards personality politics 
In the September 2015 legislative election, Greeks did not vote for Syriza, or for any political 
programme, but for the politician Alexis Tsipras himself. The failure of Greek and European 
elites to tackle the devastating six-year crisis greatly contributed to this shift towards 
personality politics in Greece, occupying much of the left’s ideological and political space. 
Soon after his electoral victory in January 2015 Alexis Tsipras announced that Greece was 
leaving behind five years of painful austerity and promised that his new government was 
ready to negotiate, for the first time, a just, mutually beneficial and viable solution with his 
European counterparts. He added that Syriza’s victory would also transform the entire EU. 
After seven months of harsh marathon negotiations with the ‘institutions’ (the EU and IMF) 
that led to closed banks, capital controls, a deal leading to a third bailout memorandum
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the Greek government-debt crisis was signed on 3 May 2010 by the then Prime Minister George Papandreou and 
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finally to snap elections for the second time in 2015, Syriza has shown that it can change and 
Alexis Tsipras’s political leadership has been consolidated at the national as well as at the 
European level.  
In a context of systemic failure, Syriza’s first victory in January 2015 was the driving force 
behind its transformation from a radical left grassroots party to a moderately progressive 
governing party. Parts of Greek society – not left-wing but nevertheless weary of Greek 
politics and the downward economic spiral – decided to give Syriza a chance and voted for 
the party.  
Tsipras represents a new kind of leftist Bonapartism,
2
 projecting himself as an unrepentant 
fighter who believes in state capacity and regular popular consultation and support. He 
managed to expel, bloodlessly, all known or suspected opponents and dissidents from Syriza 
and keep under his control a party whose political base remains still very much left-affiliated.
3
 
Tsipras runs the country with the backing of a loyal core of influential
4
 political staff. 
A hard blow to Greek parliamentarism  
Political discourse in Greece had been polarised under the pro-memoranda and anti-
memoranda, anti-austerity flagship until the first pre-election period of 2015. At the end of the 
seven-month negotiation period, the Syriza-led coalition government made unexpected 
concessions, thus silencing the anti-Memoranda rhetoric and normalising the party’s public 
discourse. This strategic shift tore the party apart and narrowed voters’ maximalist 
expectations. 
The outcome of the domestic political game has, in effect, become increasingly determined by 
EMU membership. Dominant eurozone member states and European institutions managed to 
confine the national political system within certain boundaries. In the September 2015 
election, the left-right dividing lines in national politics were clearly marked in the political 
programmes of peripheral parties, but are less visible in the programmes of the parties in 
power. Voters responded to the huge and unprecedented parliamentary consensus that was 
shaped during the ratification of the third bailout agreement in the Greek Parliament, on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
by the European Commission on behalf of the Eurogroup, the ECB and the IMF. On March 1
st
 the 2nd MoU was 
signed by the Greek government under the then Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and the three institutions. The 
3
rd
 MoU was signed by the first SYRIZA-led left coalition government on 12 July 2015. 
2
 The term ‘Bonapartism’ is used in its broadest sense to mean a centralised and rather authoritarian executive 
relying on the regular consultation of the people through plebiscites, and thus based on the fusion of elites and 
popular support.  
3
 Nine factions from the anti-capitalist, libertarian and revolutionary left, as well as the radical environmentalist 
left decided to leave the party right after the ratification of the third bailout agreement. Nevertheless, SYRIZA 
continues to be a platform of movements drawing inspiration from ‘Eurocommunism’, the radical left, the 
reformist left, socialism, ‘ecosocialism’ and feminism. Factions still loyal to the party are now being supplanted 
by blocks such as the so-called 53 block, which seems to be filling the gap left by the Left Platform. Although 
the 53 block come from the former wider group of MPs who were close to the president, they now represent the 
interparty left-wing opposition. The most prominent MPs οf the 53 block are the Minister of Finance Euclid 
Tsakalotos and former government spokesman Gabriel Sakellarides. Numerous MPs from remaining factions 
and the 53 block are positioned to the left of the leading group. Alexis Tsipras has managed to control the party 
and proceed smoothly to implement the third memorandum, with no-one questioning his leadership.
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one hand by giving a second chance to Alexis Tsipras and on the other by their conspicuous 
abstention.
5
  
Syriza has made clear that the implementation of the third memorandum is a one-way ticket 
to safeguard Greece’s participation in the EMU. The party’s main electoral promise is to 
manage the implementation of the measures prescribed by the new Memorandum and at the 
same time to alleviate the burden on the shoulders of the less well-off. Under this flagship, 
two diametrically opposed parties: left-wing Syriza and the sovereigntist right-wing ANEL, 
managed to form a coalition government for the second time in seven months, agreeing to 
implement a more or less centre-right governmental policy under the guise of a compulsory 
but temporary compromise before the ultimate victory against conservatism and austerity 
policies in the EU. Anti-memoranda discourse is now left to the Greek Communist party 
(KKE) and the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. All other parties represented in the Greek parliament 
have voted for ratification and are more or less expected to back the implementation of the 
third memorandum.  
The politics of consensus in Greece is expected to assure political stability for a while, but 
social fragmentation will deepen unless active growth policies are adopted and implemented.  
The economic governance of EMU – a ‘post-political’ space 
Participation in the EMU was and still is considered to be an opportunity; a gateway to a 
promising future and the chimera of belonging to the most advanced and prosperous 
European countries. But things have to be sacrificed in the name of monetary policy. The 
EMU is far from being an optimal currency area – it is a construction based on positivist and 
deductive principles with no room for manoeuvre.  
Under the leadership of Tsipras Syriza abandoned the promises of the so-called Thessaloniki 
social programme
6
 in just a couple of months, even though at the start of 2015 the Syriza 
president stated that the programme was non-negotiable. The minimum wage and pensions 
could not be restored, a tax-free threshold could not be introduced, and tax reductions were 
out of the question – in fact VAT levels have been raised. Even the much-hated ENFIA 
private property tax, which Syriza promised to eliminate, will be in force for years to come. 
During the September 2015 election campaign, Syriza had no other choice but to shift public 
discussion towards managing the austerity demanded by the bailout programme and focusing 
on the existing inequalities to alleviate the burden of the less well-off. This shift in strategy 
confirms once again that the hands of governments are tied regarding the Stability Pact and 
economic policy. Any unilateral fiscal initiative with expansionary impact is therefore either 
out of the question or under close surveillance. 
Furthermore, the economic governance structure of the EU offers the parties in power, 
especially those of highly indebted eurozone member states, the political legitimacy to resist 
the inflationary demands of trade unions and accept employers’ capital-friendly policies, 
leading to labour market deregulation and pro- free-market regulation, which is far removed 
from left-wing ideology. The central role of the state and its intervention in market economy 
is unfairly and unhistorically associated exclusively with the communist era. The antidote to 
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 There were 1,500,000 fewer voters than in the 2009 elections and 600,000 fewer than in the July 4
th
 
referendum. 
6
 The Thessaloniki programme is a manifesto first presented by Alexis Tsipras at the Thessaloniki International 
Trade Fair on 13th September 2014 proposing a set of policies oriented towards reversing austerity measures, 
while maintaining a balanced budget. 
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the crisis is supposed to be measures that support salary deflation; low purchasing power; a 
hyper-flexible under-regulated labour market; and a weak social security system. These 
measures completely restrict any room for manoeuvre left open for ‘socially sensitive’ 
policies.  
Denationalising fiscal administration within the EU budgetary surveillance 
framework 
The third memorandum imposes even stricter conditions than the previous two as far as the 
functioning of the state apparatus is concerned. It requires the institutional and operational 
independence of key sectors of the Greek public revenue and tax control administration as 
well as the creation of an independent Fiscal Council and the introduction of a semi-automatic 
mechanism of spending limits. The five presidents of the EU published a report in July 2015 
on the completion of economic governance that assumes the same logic. The report proposes 
the transfer of important aspects of the European Commission regulatory and enforcement 
powers to independent agencies, as well the establishment of an automatic budgetary 
mechanism regulating the euro area, which would be activated when a country exceeds its 
debt and deficit ceilings.  
The first Syriza-led government tried to challenge the principle of the full independence of 
fiscal authorities. At that time the government was opposed to the creation of autonomous 
entities, as required by previous memoranda. It rather supported their functional autonomy 
and operational self-sufficiency within the state’s central executive organisation, underlining 
the importance of keeping it under governmental supervision. The July 2015 memorandum, 
however, leaves no room for discretion to the second Syriza-led coalition government. Under 
this agreement, the Greek government has to proceed with the restructuring of key 
administrative services that guarantee the independent status of these services vis-à-vis the 
government. 
Eurozone membership is not negotiable 
For the second time in seven months Alexis Tsipras has been rewarded with a vote of 
confidence by the Greek electorate for being willing to lead tough negotiations with the 
country’s lenders and to support the euro currency. Common sense attests to the fact that the 
country was not ready
7
 for a politically organised eurozone exit – in any case this would have 
contravened European treaties; and this even if Wolfgang Schäuble’s ‘generous’ proposal of 
‘time-out’ had been accepted. If Alexis Tsipras had attempted to go down the route of a euro-
exit, no doubt he would have terminated his promising political career at the beginning.  
Tsipras’ second electoral victory made clear that eurozone membership is based on a kind of 
hard monetarist policy. In other words, eurozone membership depends on the state’s 
receptivity to incorporate austerity measures in all their facets. Strange as it may seem, the 
vast majority of Greek voters – for the time being – do not question membership of the 
eurozone, although they disagree fundamentally with its value system and know that there is 
no room for manoeuvre or discretion in national policy-making within this area of 
cooperation. 
The difficulty of the first Syriza-led government to conclude the long negotiation process with 
the EU/IMF in July 2015 introduced a whole new discussion into Brussels circles. The 
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question of the legal revocability of eurozone membership in the event of member state non-
compliance has been raised, promoting the idea of a euro – not as a common and international 
currency, as an enabler of European economy and growth – but mainly as a disciplinary lever. 
The discourse will intensify and the various sides are ready to protect their rights and 
interests. The UK’s hard Euroscepticism and proposition for the recognition of a multi-
currency union may find numerous allies among right-wing populist and left-wing parties in 
other member states, as long as attitudes towards instances of fiscal misbehaviour in eurozone 
member states are maintained. The future of EMU may therefore not be as predictable and 
propitious as it was some years ago. 
Conclusion 
Time will show the importance of the aforementioned shifts in EU politics and also test the 
soundness of the foundations of the EMU as a zone of cooperation, where member states can 
effectively defend the rights flowing from their membership of the euro area and the EU. 
But if there is one thing that the various and fragmented interests may agree on is that Syriza 
has managed to ‘Europeanise’ the Greek question. This is a real success. Syriza’s 
contribution, and perhaps legacy, lies in the notion that the Greek crisis is a European crisis 
and should therefore be resolved within the EU by a reformed and socially sensitive EU. The 
high-risk political activism undertaken by Syriza’s leadership in the first half of 2015 has 
(re)opened the debate about what kind of Europe we live in, and contributed to the creation of 
a discourse in Europe that has so far been the preserve of established elites. 
